Building and Measuring Privacy-Preserving Predictive Blacklists by Melis, Luca et al.
Building and Measuring Privacy-Preserving Predictive Blacklists
Luca Melis, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Emiliano De Cristofaro
University College London, United Kingdom
Abstract
Collaborative security initiatives are increasingly often ad-
vocated to improve timeliness and effectiveness of threat mit-
igation. Among these, collaborative predictive blacklisting
(CPB) aims to forecast attack sources based on alerts con-
tributed by multiple organizations that might be targeted in
similar ways. Alas, CPB proposals thus far have only fo-
cused on improving hit counts, but overlooked the impact of
collaboration on false positives and false negatives. More-
over, sharing threat intelligence often prompts important pri-
vacy, confidentiality, and liability issues. In this paper, we
first provide a comprehensive measurement analysis of two
state-of-the-art CPB systems: one that uses a trusted cen-
tral party to collect alerts [Soldo et al., Infocom’10] and a
peer-to-peer one relying on controlled data sharing [Freudi-
ger et al., DIMVA’15], studying the impact of collaboration
on both correct and incorrect predictions. Then, we present
a novel privacy-friendly approach that significantly improves
over previous work, achieving a better balance of true and
false positive rates, while minimizing information disclosure.
Finally, we present an extension that allows our system to
scale to very large numbers of organizations.
1 Introduction
Filtering connections from/to hosts regarded as malicious
is a common practice to reduce the number and the impact
of attacks. As it is unfeasible to perform expensive classi-
fication tasks on each connection, filtering is typically per-
formed using periodically updated lists of suspicious hosts –
or blacklists. These can be created locally or obtained from
alert repositories, such as DShield.org.
Zhang et al. [36] are the first to introduce the concept of
collaborative predictive blacklisting (CPB), whereby differ-
ent entities send their logs to a trusted entity, which in turn
provides customized blacklists based on relevance ranking.
The intuition is that attacks are often correlated, mounted by
the same sources against different networks. In fact, Katti et
al. [22] show that attack correlation persists over time, sug-
gesting that collaboration between victims can significantly
improve malicious IP detection time. Soldo et al. [33] then
improve on [36] relying on clustering and implicit recom-
mendation. Overall, collaborative approaches to threat miti-
gation, besides CPB, are increasingly advocated, with more
and more efforts promoting information sharing, e.g., by
CERT [6], Facebook [2], and the White House [34].
In this paper, we focus on two main challenges with respect
to the impact of collaboration on (i) false positives/negatives
and (ii) privacy. Prior CPB proposals [33, 36] only focus
on improving “hit counts”, i.e., the number of successfully
predicted attacks, but fail to account for incorrect predictions
(i.e., false positives/negatives). Furthermore, real-world de-
ployment of collaborative blacklisting is hindered by confi-
dentiality, liability, trust, and competitiveness concerns, as
sharing alerts could harm an organization’s reputation and
lead to disclosure of sensitive information about customers
and business practices [1, 3]. Freudiger et al. [16] are the
first to investigate privacy-friendly approaches to CPB: their
intuition is to let organizations interact in a pairwise manner
to privately estimate the benefits of collaboration, and then
have them share data with entities that are likely to yield the
most benefits. However, as discussed later in Section 4, their
pairwise protocol by Freudiger et al. only scales to a few col-
laborators.
1.1 Roadmap
First, we provide an experimental evaluation of existing
collaborative predictive blacklisting (CPB) proposals (Sec-
tion 4). We use alerts contributed to DShield.org by 70 or-
ganizations reporting an average of 4,000 daily events over
a 15-day time window. We re-implement and compare the
centralized technique by Soldo et al. [33] vs. the peer-to-
peer one based on controlled data sharing by Freudiger et
al. [16]. We find that the former achieves high hit counts
(almost doubling correct predictions compared to no collab-
oration) and relatively high recall (58%), but its accuracy is
ultimately quite poor (F1=14%) due to a significant increase
in false positives (8% precision). Whereas, the latter only
slightly improves hit counts compared to no collaboration,
but also yields fewer incorrect predictions, thus resulting in
better accuracy overall (up to 29% F1).
Then, we propose a novel approach aiming to capture the
best of the two worlds (Section 5). We use a hybrid model
relying on a semi-trusted authority (STA), which acts as a
coordinating entity to facilitate clustering, without having ac-
cess to the raw data. The STA clusters contributors based
on the similarity of their logs (without seeing these logs),
and helps organizations in the same cluster to share relevant
data. We experiment with a few clustering algorithms using
the number of common attacks as a measure of similarity,
which is computed in a privacy-preserving way, and experi-
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ment with privacy-friendly within-clusters sharing strategies,
i.e., only disclosing the details of common attacks and/or pri-
vately discovering correlated attacks. Our experimental re-
sults show that our hybrid model balances out the increase in
hit counts and in false positives brought about by information
sharing (74% recall, 19% precision, 30% F1 score), achiev-
ing up to 4x increase in hit counts compared to Freudiger
et al. [16] and doubling overall accuracy compared to Soldo
et al. [33]. Finally, we present a scalability analysis of our
scheme (Section 6), introducing a simple variant that allows
it to efficiently scale to very large numbers of organizations.
1.2 Contributions
In summary, our paper makes two main contributions.
First, we present a measurement study of existing CPB ap-
proaches aiming to capture the overall effects of collabora-
tion, highlighting important open problems. Second, we in-
troduce a novel, privacy-friendly and scalable approach to
CPB that achieves a better balance between hit counts and
incorrect predictions. Our system minimizes the amount of
information disclosed in the process and achieves scalability
in the presence of large numbers of collaborating entities.
2 Related Work
Collaborative Intrusion Detection. Katti et al. [22] are
among the first to measure correlated attacks, i.e., attacks
mounted by the same sources against different networks, es-
tablishing that they are very common yet highly targeted.
They show that attack correlation persists over time and sug-
gest that collaboration between victims could significantly
improve malicious IP detection time. In [36], Zhang et al. in-
troduce highly predictive blacklisting, having different or-
ganizations contribute alerts to a central repository, such as
DShield.org, which in turn provides them with daily person-
alized (predictive) blacklists. The prediction uses a relevance
ranking scheme similar to PageRank, measuring the correla-
tion of an attacker to a contributor based on their history as
well as the attacker’s recent log production patterns. Then,
Soldo et al. [33] improve on [36] using an implicit recom-
mendation system to discover similar victims as well as clus-
ters of correlated victims and attackers. In their model, the
presence of attacks performed by the same source around the
same time leads to stronger similarity among victims, and a
neighborhood model (k-NN) is applied to cluster similar vic-
tims. Cross Association (CA) co-clustering [7] is then used
to discover groups of correlated attackers and victims, and
prediction within the cluster is done via a time-series algo-
rithm – Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
– capturing attacks’ temporal trends.
Beyond blacklisting, other work focuses on other collab-
orative security problems. Felegyhazi et al. [14] perform
proactive prediction of malicious domain use: starting from
a seed of confirmed bad domains, they predict clusters of re-
lated domains based on name server features (zone files con-
taining sub-domains and authoritative name servers), and in-
fer new bad domains. Liu et al. [26], based on externally ob-
servable properties of an organization’s network, aim to pre-
dict breaches without the organization’s cooperation. Woods
et al. [35] apply data mining to identify subsets of shared
information that are semantically related, while Garrido et
al. [17] introduce game-theoretic models to analyze the ef-
fects of cyber-security information sharing among organiza-
tions. Sirivianos et al. [32] propose a collaborative system
that enables hosts with no email classification functionality to
check whether a host is a spammer or not. Each host then as-
sesses the trustworthiness of spam reporters by auditing their
reports and leveraging the social network of the reporters’
administrators.
Privacy In Collaborative Intrusion Detection. Porras and
Shmatikov [30] discuss privacy risks prompted by sharing
security-related data and propose anonymization and sani-
tization techniques to address them. However, follow-up
work [9, 25] demonstrates that these techniques make data
less useful and anyway prone to de-anonymization.
Burkhart et al. [5] introduce a few privacy-preserving pro-
tocols based on secure multiparty computation (MPC) for ag-
gregation of network statistics. This is also explored in [4],
where entities send encrypted data to a central repository
that aggregates contributions. However, statistics only iden-
tify the most prolific attack sources and yield global mod-
els, which, as discussed in [36], miss a significant number
of attacks and yield poor prediction performance. Nagaraja
et al. [28] introduce an inference algorithm, BotGrep, to pri-
vately discover botnet hosts and links in network traffics, re-
lying on Private Set Intersection [12]. Davidson et al. [10]
propose a game-theoretic model for software vulnerability
sharing between two competing parties. Their protocol re-
lies on a private set operation (PSO) technique to limit the
amount of information disclosed. However, it does not scale
for more than two entities. Finally, Freudiger et al. [16] fo-
cus on collaborative predictive blacklisting based on a pair-
wise controlled data sharing approach. They focus on iden-
tifying which metrics (e.g., number of common attacks) can
be used to privately estimate the benefits of collaboration be-
tween two organizations, rather than proposing a deployable
system. In fact, as discussed later, their pairwise approach
does not scale to many organizations.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Background
Time Series Prediction. We use Exponentially Weighted
Moving Average (EWMA) to perform prediction. Given a
signal over time r(t), we indicate with r˜(t+1) the predicted
value of r(t+1), given past observations r(t′) at time t′ ≤ t.
The predicted signal is computed as:
r˜(t+ 1) =
t∑
t′=1
α · (1− α)t−t′ · r(t′) (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a smoothing coefficient, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , t}
denotes the training window, and t + 1 is the time slot to be
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predicted. For small values of α, EWMA aggregates past in-
formation uniformly across the training window, while, with
a large α, the prediction algorithm focuses more on events
taking place in the recent past.
Metrics. To evaluate the performance of the predictions,
we use true and false positives and negatives, denoted, re-
spectively, as TP, FP, TN, FN. We derive precision (PPV),
recall (TPR), and F1-Score, respectively, as TP/(TP+FP),
TP/(TP+FN), and the harmonic mean of PPV and TPR. We
also measure the average improvement/increase in TP, FP,
and FN when compared to when no collaboration occurs be-
tween organizations, using, resp., TPimpr = (TPc−TP)/TP,
FPincr = (FPc − FP)/FP, and FNincr = (FNc − FN)/FN,
where the c notation denotes values after collaboration.
Cryptographic protocols. In the rest of the paper, we use
a number of cryptographic protocols for privacy-preserving
computations. To ease presentation, we defer their descrip-
tion to Appendix A.
3.2 Dataset
Aiming to design a meaningful empirical analysis of
CPB, we gather a dataset of blacklisted IP addresses from
DShield.org, a collaborative firewall log correlation system
to which various organizations volunteer daily alerts. Each
entry in the logs consists of a pseudonymized Contributor
ID (the target), the source IP address (the attacker), source
and target port number, and the timestamp. With DShield’s
permission, we have collected logs using a JavaScript web
crawler, gathering, on average, 10 million logs every day. We
exclude entries for invalid or non-routable IP addresses, and
discard port numbers, then, for each IP address, we extract its
/24 subnet and use /24 addresses for all experiments, follow-
ing experimental choices made in prior work [16, 33, 36].
Training and Testing Sets. We use the DShield dataset both
as a training set and a testing set (i.e., ground truth), consid-
ering a sliding window of 5 days for training and 1 day for
testing, as done in [16, 33]. We select a 15-day period (i.e., 10
sliding windows) and restrict our evaluations to a reasonably-
sized sample of regularly contributing organizations. We se-
lect the top-100 contributors, based on the number of unique
IPs reported, provided that they report logs every day. Most
contributors (around 60%) submit less than 100K logs, while
20% submit between 100K and 500K, and only a handful of
organizations contribute very large amounts of logs (above
1M). We then pick 70 organizations, for each time window,
leaving out the top-10 and the bottom-20 contributors. We
do so, like in previous work [16, 33], to minimize bias. Our
final sample dataset includes 30 million attacks, contributed
by 118 unique organizations (as the 70 contributors selected
in each time window vary) over 15 days, each reporting a
daily average of 600 suspicious (unique) IPs and 4,000 at-
tack events.
Note that we have also repeated our experiments on a
larger number of organizations (150) and on two more sets
of DShield logs using 15-day periods from other time inter-
vals, but have not found any significant difference in the re-
sults. Moreover, we remark that the way we count FP is an
upper bound since we do not have ground truth as to whether
the absence of an IP from the testing set occurs when the IP
is not suspicious or if it simply does not generate requests.
Nonetheless, it does not really matter for our evaluations
since our main goal is to compare different approaches with
each other.
Notation. We use O = {Oi}ni=1 to denote a group of n or-
ganizations, where each Oi holds a dataset Di of alerts, i.e.,
suspicious IP addresses along with the related timestamps.
We aim to predict IP addresses generating attacks to each
Oi in the next day, using, as the training set, both its local
dataset Di, as well the set D′i, with suspicious IP addresses
obtained by collaborating with other organizations. As dis-
cussed above, for each time window, we consider n = 70
organizations using alerts collected from DShield.
4 Existing Collaborative Predictive
Blacklisting Approaches
4.1 Soldo et al. [33]’s Implicit Recommenda-
tion (No Privacy)
We first evaluate Soldo et al [33]’s CPB approach based on
implicit recommendation. We do so with a twofold goal: (1)
to evaluate false positives and false negatives, which were
not taken into consideration in [33], and (2) to compare
against privacy-friendly approaches, presented later. Essen-
tially, Soldo et al.’s work builds on [36], which bases on a rel-
evance ranking scheme similar to PageRank, measuring the
correlation of an attacker to a contributor relying on their his-
tory as well as the attacker’s recent log production patterns.
Soldo et al. improve [36] by using an implicit recommen-
dation system to discover similar victims as well as groups
of correlated victims and attackers. The presence of attacks
performed by the same source around the same time leads
to stronger victim similarity, and a neighborhood model (k-
NN) is applied to cluster similar victims. Cross Association
(CA) co-clustering [7] is then used to discover groups of cor-
related attackers and victims, and prediction within the clus-
ter is done via EWMA to capture attacks’ temporal trends.
We have re-implemented their system in Python and used
Chakrabarti’s implementation of Cross Association (CA) as
per [7], and run the experiments on the dataset introduced in
Section 3.2.
We start by measuring the basic predictor which only relies
on a local EWMA time series algorithm (TS), using α = 0.9
as it yields the best results, then, apply the co-clustering tech-
niques (TS-CA), and, finally, implement their full scheme by
combining k-NN to cluster victims based on their similarity
with CA and TS (TS-CA-k-NN). Fig. 1 illustrates the im-
provement/increase in TP, FP, FN (compared to the TS base-
line) as well as TPR, PPV, and F1, with various k values
(ranging from 1 to 35) used by the k-NN algorithm to dis-
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Figure 1: Soldo et al. [33]: (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase (y-axis in log scale), (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision, and (f) F1
measure.
cover similar organizations. Obviously, the k-NN parameter
k does not affect TS-CA and TS.
Fig. 1(a) shows that, with TS-CA-k-NN, TPimpr increases
significantly with k, almost doubling the “hit counts” com-
pared to the TS baseline, whereas, TS-CA improves less
(0.67). On the other hand, however, there is FPincr too, 5-
to 50-fold, as clusters become bigger (Fig. 1(b)), and nat-
urally, this stark increase in FP leads to low precision, as
shown in Fig. 1(e). FNs also always increase compared to
TS (Fig. 1(c)), specifically, they double with TS-CA and in-
crease between 0.55 and 0.95 (less for larger k values) com-
pared to TS. Moreover, FNincr affects TPR (Fig. 1(d)), with
an increase between 0.58 and 0.66. TPimpr does not corre-
spond to a comparable increase in TPR, due to the poor FN
performance, as shown by the fact that TS-CA-k-NN reaches
0.95 in TPimpr but only at most 0.66 TPR compared to 0.59
with the baseline TS. Overall, Soldo et al.’s techniques do
not perform well in practice, as they yield lower F1 measures
(0.16 with TS-CA, and at most 0.14 with TS-CA-k-NN) than
a simple local time-series prediction (0.26) – see Fig. 1(f).
4.2 Freudiger et al. [16]’s Peer-to-Peer Con-
trolled Data Sharing
Next, we evaluate the system by Freudiger et al. [16],
whereby organizations interact pairwise, aiming to privately
estimate the benefits of collaboration, and then share data
with entities that are likely to yield the most benefits. The
authors also use DShield data and perform prediction us-
ing EWMA. They find that: (1) the number of common at-
tacks is the best predictor of benefits, which can be estimated
privately, using Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-
CA) [11]; and (2) sharing only the intersection of attacks –
which can be done privately using Private Set Intersection
(PSI) [12] – is almost as beneficial as sharing everything.1
Their goal is really to assess benefit estimation/sharing strate-
gies, rather than to focus on deployment. They assume a net-
work of 100 organizations, select the “top 50” among all pos-
sible 4950 pairs (in terms of estimated benefits), and only ex-
periment on those. Naturally, without a coordinating entity, it
is impossible to rank the pairs, so they suggest that collabo-
ration should take place: either between organizations whose
estimated benefits are above a threshold, although it is not
stated how to set this threshold; or by each organization se-
lecting the top x ones with the biggest estimated benefits, but
do not experiment with or discuss how x impacts overhead
or true/false positives. Thus, we replicate both approaches,
specifically, by experimenting: (A) with the top 1% to 5% of
global pairs, and (B) having each organization pick 1 to 35
most similar organizations.
Fig. 2 shows the improvement/increase in TP, FP, FN
(compared to a baseline with no sharing) as well as TPR,
PPV and F1 with increasing percentage of global pairs (A).
Similarly, Fig. 3 presents the results for approach (B).
1See Appendix A for background on these cryptographic protocols.
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Figure 2: Freudiger et al. [16] (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase, (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision and (f) F1 measure, with
increasing percentage of global pairs (approach (A)).
Looking at TPimpr, (A) yields 13% increase when 3% of
global pairs are selected whereas for (B), i.e. picking lo-
cal pairs, TPimpr increases along with the number of local
pairs selected. When an organization collaborates with its 5
most similar ones, we observe a 27% TPimpr while when
it collaborates with 35, TPimpr reaches 45% (see Fig. 3(a)).
Figs. 2(b) and 3(b), show that (A) has a rather small FPincr
(13% increase when the 75 top pairs are selected) compared
to (B) which is affected by the number of pairs that each or-
ganizations picks for collaboration. When an organization
collaborates with 5 others a 25% FPincr is observed on aver-
age while when it collaborates with 30 others FPincr reaches
80%. Moreover, Figs. 2(c) and 3(c) illustrate that both ap-
proaches achieve a decrease in false negatives with the sec-
ond approach achieving bigger decreases as the number of
collaborators increases. Finally, in (A), when 4% of all pairs
(i.e., when ∼ 100 pairs are selected), we get an F1 mea-
sure of 0.29. As per (B), we observe that F1 measures are
slightly affected by the number of pairs that each organiza-
tion chooses for collaboration. The best F1 score (0.27) is
obtained when an organization picks 5 others for collabora-
tion. Overall, both approaches improve precision and recall
of the system, resulting in an enhanced F1 score, compared to
a local approach. Although the increase in TP is not as high
as with the non-private approach of [33], a more balanced in-
crease of false positives and a decrease of the false negatives
seems possible. However, the system is limited in scalability,
due to its peer-to-peer design. Moreover, when organizations
share only the intersection of their datasets it is not possible
for them to obtain events about new attackers that they have
never witnessed before in their own datasets.
5 A Novel Approach to Privacy-
Friendly CPB
In this section, we introduce a novel privacy-friendly sys-
tem which relies on a semi-trusted authority, or STA, acting
as a coordinating entity to facilitate clustering without having
access to the raw data. In other words, the STA clusters con-
tributors based on the similarity of their logs (without access-
ing these logs), and helps organizations in the same cluster to
share relevant logs.
5.1 Overview
Our system involves four steps: (1) First, organizations
interact in a pairwise manner to privately compute a simi-
larity measure of their logs, based on the number of com-
mon attacks. Then, (2) the STA collects the similarity mea-
sures from each organization to a matrix depicted as O2O
and performs clustering on it. Next, (3) the STA reports
to each organization the identifiers of other organizations in
the same cluster (if any), so that they collaboratively, yet
privately, share logs to boost the accuracy of their predic-
tions, by either sharing common attacks (intersection), corre-
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Figure 3: Freudiger et al. [16] (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase, (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision and (f) F1 measure, with
increasing number of local pairs (approach (B)).
lated attacks (IP2IP), or both.2 Finally, (4) each organization
performs EWMA prediction based on their logs, augmented
with those shared from entities in the same cluster.
This approach is hybrid in that interaction is privacy-
friendly, using a central party (STA) which is not trusted with
data in-the-clear, but only with similarity measures. More-
over, we follow a data minimization approach as organiza-
tions only share information about common and correlated
attacks: specifically, in (1), the number of common attacks is
computed privately using PSI-CA [11], while, in (3), sharing
of common and correlated attacks is also privacy-preserving,
as we rely on PSI [12] and private aggregation [27].
Settings. We use datasets and settings from Section 3.2. We
cluster organizations (Step (2)) utilizing various algorithms,
i.e., Agglomerative Clustering, k-means, and k-NN. More-
over, for the IP2IP method, we only consider the top-1000
attackers (i.e., the top-1000 heavy hitters) in each cluster, for
each 5-day training-set window – rather than looking for cor-
relations over all the /24 IP space – and for each IP we extract
50 correlated ones. Finally, as in previous experiments, we
set α = 0.9 for EWMA.
5.2 Results
We now present the results of our extensive experimental
evaluation. As we use different clustering algorithms, we re-
fer the reader to Appendix B for a brief overview of them.
2For comparison, we also consider baseline approaches, i.e., sharing nothing (lo-
cal) or sharing everything (global).
Our experiments are written in Python, using the scikit-learn
machine learning suite, and will be made available with the
final version of the paper.
Agglomerative Clustering. We consider different numbers
of desired clusters (k), ranging from 1 to 35, setting affinity
and linkage parameters to cosine and average, respectively,
to indicate what distance measures to use between sets of
observations. In Fig. 4(a)–4(c), we plot average TPimpr,
FPincr, and FNincr with increasing number of clusters. Un-
surprisingly, IP2IP achieves smaller TPimpr results (at most
0.20) than global (up to 1.10), which however incurs higher
FNincr (0.3) and above all FPincr (1000). Fig. 4(d) shows
that recall (TPR) always improves when sharing, with in-
tersection reaching 0.76. When combining intersection and
IP2IP, TPR slowly degrades with smaller clusters (peaks at
0.68 for k = 5), while, with IP2IP, it increases (0.67 for
k = 35). Because of the increase in FN, global performs
worse in terms of recall (0.66) although obtaining the best
TPimpr. From Fig. 4(e), we observe that local yields the
best precision (0.16), followed by intersection (0.15, slightly
growing for larger k), while IP2IP and IP2IP+intersection
slowly increase up to 0.13. Global performs poorly overall
(up to 0.04) due to high FP. Finally, Fig. 4(f) plots the F1
measure: intersection achieves slightly better scores than lo-
cal (0.26 vs 0.25), while its combination with IP2IP, or just
IP2IP are slightly worse (0.22).
k-means. Next, we use k-means for clustering and obtain re-
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Figure 4: Agglomerative Clustering: (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase (y-axis in log scale), (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision, (f)
F1 measure.
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Figure 5: k-means: (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase (y-axis in log scale), (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision, (f) F1 measure.
sults similar to agglomerative clustering. Thus, we decide to
restrict to stronger correlations, by only taking into account
organizations closer to the cluster’s centroid, and excluding
the rest of them as outliers. We set a distance threshold and
experiment with it empirically, finding that the optimal set-
ting is the 40th percentile, i.e., the cluster distance value be-
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Figure 6: k-NN: (a) TP improvement, (b) FP increase (y-axis in log scale), (c) FN increase, (d) TPR, (e) Precision, (f) F1 measure.
low which 40% of the organizations can be found. Fig. 5(a)–
5(c) plot the average improvement in TP and increase in FP
and FN, respectively. TPimpr is almost constant with IP2IP
(0.2) independent of the cluster sizes, while with the other
methods it decreases faster due to the distance thresholds,
ranging from 1.1 with global for k = 1 to 0.1 of intersection
for k = 35. IP2IP shows steady FNincr values compared to
other methods (−0.2, i.e., a 20% decrease) which leads to a
better performance in TPR, as shown in Fig. 5(d), for k ≥ 10
(up to 0.71). Furthermore, intersection yields the best per-
formance in FNincr (−0.52), with k = 1. Fig. 5(f) shows
the best F1 measure (0.30) is reached with k = 5, due to a
peak both in PPV and TPR. IP2IP performs slightly worse
(0.23) than local (0.28) while poor F1 values for global, with
k = 35, (0.18) are due to its bad PPV (0.10) – see Fig. 5(e).
k-NN. Recall that k indicates the number of nearest neigh-
bors that each entity considers as its most similar ones. Thus,
organizations can end up in more than one neighborhood.
Since the algorithm builds a neighborhood for each organi-
zation, not all clusters have the same strength, so we only
consider strong clusters in terms of their members similar-
ity and as done with k-means, after tuning the parameters,
we set a distance threshold as the 40th percentile to leave
possible outliers out of the clusters. From Fig. 6(a), we ob-
serve that IP2IP+intersection yields the second best perfor-
mance in TPimpr (0.38, with k = 35), while global peaks
at 0.60. In terms of FPincr, IP2IP doubles it (for k = 35),
while intersection achieves the lowest value with 0.51 (again,
for k = 35). As with previous clustering algorithms, we
notice that intersection yields the best decrease in FN, i.e.,
−0.5 with k = 35. Intersection also achieves the highest
TPR (up to 0.77) with larger cluster sizes (i.e., for k ≥ 10),
while its combination with the IP2IP reduces it (0.71) – see
Fig. 6(d). Fig. 6(e) shows that intersection has the best PPV
(0.19 for k = 15), similar to local (0.18), while IP2IP per-
forms worse (0.16) due to higher FPincr (almost doubling
the FP for k = 35). Finally, from Fig. 6(f), note that intersec-
tion yields the highest F1 (0.30 for k = 15).
5.3 Discussion
We summarize the best results for each clustering algo-
rithm, in terms of highest F1, recall, precision, and TPimpr,
in Tables 1–4. We note that intersection is that sharing mech-
anism that maximizes all metrics, except for TPimpr, which
is instead maximized with IP2IP+intersection. Both k-means
and k-NN peak at 0.30 in F1 including, respectively, 280
and 240 collaborators over all time windows. Agglomer-
ative clustering involves all 700 contributors and achieves
F1 = 0.27. k-NN, k = 35 yields the best results for TPR
(0.77), while both k-NN, k = 35 and k-means, k = 5 achieve
0.19 in PPV. In terms of TPimpr, k-means reaches a maxi-
mum of 0.61 with k = 1 and clusters of size 28 on average,
selecting 270 collaborators overall. Slightly lower improve-
ments are achieved with other clustering algorithms, but with
more collaborators benefiting from sharing, as well as fewer
FP.
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Setting Max F1 [Sharing Intersection]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglomerative 15 4.6 700 0.72 0.16 0.38± 3.51 0.71± 4.49 -0.42 0.27
k-means 5 5.8 280 0.73 0.19 0.44± 4.21 0.31± 1.47 -0.32 0.30
k-NN 15 6 240 0.74 0.19 0.27± 0.20 0.33± 0.28 -0.37 0.30
Table 1: Best Cases of our Experiments for F1.
Setting Max TPR [Sharing Intersection]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglomerative 1 70 700 0.76 0.15 0.50± 3.95 1.12± 6.98 -0.53 0.25
k-means 5 5.8 280 0.73 0.19 0.44± 4.21 0.31± 1.47 -0.32 0.30
k-NN 35 14 320 0.77 0.17 0.32± 0.21 0.51± 0.50 -0.49 0.28
Table 2: Best Cases of our Experiments for TPR.
Setting Max PPV [Sharing Intersection]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglomerative 25 2.8 700 0.69 0.16 0.33± 3.29 0.47± 2.23 -0.35 0.26
k-means 5 5.8 280 0.73 0.19 0.44± 4.21 0.31± 1.47 -0.32 0.30
k-NN 15 6 240 0.74 0.19 0.27± 0.20 0.33± 0.28 -0.37 0.30
Table 3: Best Cases of our Experiments for PPV.
Setting Max TP Improvement [Sharing IP2IP+intersection ]
Clustering k Avg Size #Coll. TPR PPV TPimpr FPincr FNincr F1
Agglomerative 1 70 700 0.67 0.11 0.52± 3.95 5.33± 16.9 -0.08 0.19
k-means 1 28 270 0.64 0.11 0.61± 5.36 3.55± 7.17 -0.17 0.18
k-NN 35 14 320 0.71 0.14 0.38± 0.25 1.51± 1.02 -0.19 0.23
Table 4: Best Cases of our Experiments for TPimpr .
Main take-aways. Data sharing always helps organizations
forecast attacks, compared to performing predictions locally.
Predicting based on all data from collaborators yields the
highest improvement in TPimpr – especially for bigger clus-
ters – but with a dramatic increase in FPincr. When organi-
zations share correlated attacks (IP2IP), we observe a steady
TPimpr, while sharing common attacks (intersection) outper-
forms the former when bigger clusters are formed. However,
intersection introduces lower FPincr, ultimately leading to
better precision and F1 measures. IP2IP+intersection always
outperforms the two separate methods in terms of TPimpr,
thus, it is the recommended strategy if one only wants to
maximize the number of predicted attacks.
Impact of cluster size. With agglomerative clustering, each
organization is assigned to exactly one cluster and thus par-
ticipates in/benefits from collaboration. We observe higher
TPR for bigger clusters and, generally, a stable improvement
in TP is achieved on average. Similar results are obtained
with k-means when all organizations are assigned to clusters.
However, when we set a distance threshold, creating more
consistent clusters, we observe fluctuations in TPR: as clus-
ters get smaller much faster (in relation to k value), IP2IP
starts outperforming intersection. This indicates that corre-
lated attacks can improve knowledge of organizations and
enhance their local predictions, especially in smaller clusters.
With k-NN, a different behavior is observed: for smaller clus-
ters, IP2IP achieves higher TPR (up to 0.7 for k = 5) but, as
clusters get bigger, intersection yields the best results (up to
0.77 for k = 35). Overall, collaborating in big clusters leads
to high TPimpr but at the same time it introduces significant
FPincr.
Increase/Improvement in TP/FP/FN. We also find that for
all clustering algorithms, maximizing TPimpr always leads
to higher FPincr, from 1.51 of k-NN up to 5.33 of Agglom-
erative. The settings that maximize the F1 measure, TPR, and
PPV, (when sharing intersection) also minimize FNincr, e.g.
agglomerative with k = 1 achieves −0.53 FNincr. In gen-
eral, we observe that (privacy-friendly) collaboration does
yield a remarkable increase in TP but also in FP, which results
in a limited improvement in F1 score compared to predicting
using local logs only. However, as discussed earlier, note that
we count FP in a conservative way and that our main goal is
really to measure the effect of different collaboration strate-
gies on the prediction (as well as comparing to state of the
art CPB techniques [16, 33]), seeking to improve TP while
keeping the increase in FP as low as possible.
5.4 Comparison to Soldo et al. and Freudiger
et al.
We observe that [33] achieves higher maximum TPimpr
(0.95) than our hybrid approach (0.61 with k-means, k = 1).
However, our privacy-preserving techniques outperform [33]
both in terms of recall (TPR) and precision (PPV). For in-
stance, with k-NN, k = 35 our system yields a TPR of 0.77
(vs. 0.66 for [33]). Similarly, with k-means, k = 5 our
system’s PPV reaches 0.19 whereas [33]’s best precision is
0.08. As a result, our hybrid model yields larger (up to 2x)
F1 scores (e.g., 0.3 with k-NN, k = 15) than [33] (0.14).
Moreover, our novel hybrid approach yields better results
than [16]-(A), in terms of TPimpr and TPR. For example,
in [16]-(A) TPimpr reaches only up to 0.13 (top 3% of global
pairs) while in our system it reaches 0.61 with k-means,
k = 1 (i.e., up to 4x improved hit counts). Likewise, we
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achieve a TPR of 0.77 (e.g., k-NN, k = 35) while the best
TPR of [16]-(A) is 0.66 (top 1% of global pairs). Although
the F1 scores achieved in both cases are similar – 0.30 for our
hybrid system vs. 0.29 for [16]-(A) – with our model more
organizations benefit from collaboration. Finally, we observe
that our hybrid approach yields fairly similar results to [16]-
(B) in terms of TPR, PPV and F1. Nevertheless, our sys-
tem achieves better TPimpr than [16]-(B) (0.61 for k-means,
k = 1 vs. 0.45 with 35 local pairs) since not only common
but also correlated attacks are shared within the clusters.
6 Implementing At Scale
As discussed above, our system involves four steps: (1)
secure computation of pairwise similarity, (2) clustering, (3)
secure data sharing within the clusters, and (4) time-series
prediction. To assess its scalability, we need to evaluate com-
putation and communication complexities incurred by each
step. Naturally, (1) and (3) dominate complexities as they
require running a number of cryptographic protocols that
depends on the number of organizations involved. In fact,
clustering incurs a negligible overhead: on commodity hard-
ware, to perform clustering with 1,000 organizations, it takes
6.1ms for k-means, 81ms for agglomerative, and 5.2ms for
k-NN (k = 2). Also, time-series EWMA prediction requires
4.6µs per IP, so it takes 4.6ms for 1,000 IPs.
As we compute pairwise similarity based on the amount of
common attacks between two organizations, and support its
secure computation via PSI-CA [11], step (1) requires a num-
ber of protocol runs quadratic in the number of organizations.
In our experiments (see details below), it takes 1.98s and
2.12MB bandwidth for one protocol execution, using 2048-
bit moduli, with sets of size 4,000 (the average number of at-
tacks observed by each organization). As for (3), i.e., secure
within-cluster sharing of events related to common attacks
(intersection), we rely on PSI-DT [12], and it takes 1.24s and
2.18MB for a single execution with the same settings. Thus,
complexities may quickly become prohibitive when more or-
ganizations are involved or more alerts are used.
Server-aided Secure Computation. Aiming to improve
scalability, we introduce a variant supporting secure com-
putation of pairwise similarity as well as secure log
sharing without a quadratic number of public-key opera-
tions/quadratic communication overhead. Recall that we rely
on a semi-trusted authority, STA, for clustering and coordina-
tion, which is assumed to follow protocol specifications and
not to collude with other organizations, thus, we can actu-
ally use it to also help with secure computations. Inspired by
Kamara et al.’s server-aided PSI [21], we extend our frame-
work by replacing public-key cryptography operations with
pseudo-random permutations (PRP), which we instantiate us-
ing AES. Specifically, we minimize interactions among pairs
of organizations so that the complexity incurred by each of
them is constant, while only imposing a minimal, linear com-
munication overhead on STA.
Algorithm 1 ENCRYPTION [All Organizations]
for each Oi ∈ O do
Si ← ∅, Ei ← ∅, Ki ← ∅
for each (dj , timej) ∈ Di do
for cnt := 1 to COUNT (dj) do
Si ← Si ∪ PRPk(dj ||cnt)
kj ← H(dj ||cnt)
Ei ← Ei ∪ Enckj (dj , timej)
Ki ← Ki ∪ kj
Send Si, Ei to STA and store Ki
Algorithm 2 O2O COMPUTATION [STA]
for each Oi ∈ O do
for each Oj 6= Oi do
O2O[i, j]← |Si ∩ Sj |
Buff[i, j]← {(`, Ej`),∀` ∈ INDEX(Si ∩ Sj)}
Perform Clustering on O2O[·, ·]
Send relevant Buff[·, ·] entries to organizations in the same cluster
Algorithm 3 LOG SHARING [Organizations in C∗]
for each Oi ∈ C∗ do
S′i ← ∅
for each Oj 6= Oi ∈ C∗ do
for each (`, Ej`) ∈ Buff[i, j] do
S′i = S
′
i ∪ Deck`(E`)
Our extension involves four phases: (1) setup, where, as
in [21], one organization generates a random key κ and sends
it to the other organizations, (2) encryption (Algorithm 1),
where each organization Oi evaluates the PRP on each entry
dj in their sets and encrypts the associated timestamp timej ,
(3) O2O computation (Algorithm 2), where STA computes
the magnitude of common attacks between each pair of orga-
nizations in order to perform clustering, and (4) log sharing
(Algorithm 3), where organizations in the same cluster C∗
receive information about common attacks (S′i-s).
Note that building the O2O matrix is actually optimized
using hash tables (i.e., dense hash set and dense hash map
from Sparehash [19]). Also, since sets in our system are
multi-sets, we concatenate counters to the IP address, so that
the STA cannot tell which and how many IPs appear more
than once.
Experimental Evaluation. To fully grasp the scalability of
the server-aided extension, and compare it to using “tradi-
tional” PSI-CA and PSI-DT, we report execution times for
increasing number of participating organizations. We bench-
mark the performance of PSI-CA [11] and PSI-DT [12] using
2048-bit moduli, modifying the OpenSSL/GMP-based C im-
plementation of [13], as well as the PRP-based scheme pre-
sented above and inspired by Kamara et al.’s work [21]. Ex-
periments are run using two 2.3GHz Intel Core i5 CPUs with
8GB of RAM connected via a 100Mbps Ethernet link.
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) plot computation and communica-
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Figure 7: Computation (a) and communication (b) overhead at each organization for PSI-CA, PSI-DT, and PRP-based scheme, and com-
munication overhead at the STA in PRP scheme (c).
tion complexities incurred by an individual organization vis-
a`-vis the total number of organizations involved in the sys-
tem, while Fig. 7(c) reports the communication overhead in-
troduced on the STA-side for the PRP scheme. Observe that
complexities for PSI-CA/PSI-DT protocols on each organi-
zation grow linearly in the number of organizations (hence,
quadratic overall). For instance, if 1,000 organizations are
involved, it would take about 16 minutes per organization,
each transmitting 1GB. Whereas, the PRP-based scheme in-
curs constant complexities on each organization (57.6ms and
120KB) and an appreciably low communication overhead on
the STA (about 100MB) for 1,000 organizations.
IP2IP. We also evaluate the IP2IP method whereby organi-
zations interact with STA in order to discover cluster-wide
correlated attacks. Assuming clusters of 100 organizations
and an IP2IP matrix of (224 · 224)/2 (recall that we consider
the whole /24 IP space), we measure a 2.7s running time per
organization with 41KB of bandwidth as well as a 0.07s over-
head on the STA with 4.1MB bandwidth. Recall that we use
the private Count-Min sketch based implementation by Melis
et al. [27], which results in the private aggregation of 10,336
elements. Note that, even if clusters are bigger than 100, as
detailed in [27], one can still perform private aggregation on
multiple subgroups (e.g., of size 100) without endangering
organizations’ privacy.
Security. Our system does not leak any information about
the logs of each organization to the STA, with or without us-
ing the server-aided variant. Clustering is performed over
similarity measures computed obliviously to STA, and so
does within-cluster data sharing. Privacy-preserving compu-
tation occurs by using existing secure protocols such as PSI-
CA/PSI-DT by De Cristofaro et al. [12, 11]), server-aided
PSI by Kamara et al. [21], as well as private recommenda-
tion via succinct sketches by Melis et al. [27]. Therefore, we
do not provide any additional proofs in the paper as the secu-
rity of our techniques straightforwardly relies on that of these
protocols.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first presented the results of a compre-
hensive measurement study of collaborative predictive black-
listing (CPB) techniques, specifically, one relying on trusted
central party by Soldo et al. [33] and another using privacy-
preserving data sharing by Freudiger et al. [16]. Then, we
introduced and evaluated a novel, hybrid approach that im-
proves upon the first two. Our experiments evaluated correct
and incorrect predictions, as well as the real-world impact of
collaboration (e.g., the improvement on true positives and the
increase of false positives/negatives), using a dataset of alerts
obtained from DShield.org. We found that, overall, having
access to more (attack) logs does not necessarily result in
better predictions – in fact, the approach proposed by Soldo
et al. [33], although considered the state of the art in CPB,
achieves high hit counts (almost doubling the number of cor-
rect predictions) but also suffers from very poor precision due
to very high FP. On the other hand, the privacy-friendly de-
centralized system proposed by Freudiger et al. [16] achieves
better accuracy than [33], but with a much smaller improve-
ment in TP. Moreover, their system does not scale due its
peer-to-peer nature.
Then, our analysis shows that our novel hybrid approach
manages to outperform [33] in terms of accuracy (up to 2x)
and [16] in terms of hit counts (up to 4x), while maintaining
an acceptable level of privacy and achieving high scalabil-
ity. As part of future work, we plan to conduct a longitudi-
nal measurement to fully grasp the effectiveness of privacy-
enhanced CPB in the wild, as well as study other collabora-
tive security problems, e.g., in the context of spam, malware
samples, and DNS poisoning.
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A Cryptography Background
Adversarial Model. We use standard security models for
secure two-party computation and consider semi-honest ad-
versaries. In the rest of this paper, the term adversary refers
to insiders, i.e., protocol participants. Outside adversaries
are not considered, since their actions can be mitigated via
standard network security techniques. Following definitions
in [18], protocols secure in the presence of semi-honest ad-
versaries assume that parties faithfully follow all protocol
specifications and do not misrepresent any information re-
lated to their inputs, e.g., size and content. However, during
or after protocol execution, any party might (passively) at-
tempt to infer additional information about the other party’s
input. This model is formalized by considering an ideal im-
plementation where a trusted third party (TTP) receives the
inputs of both parties and outputs the result of the defined
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function. Security in the presence of semi-honest adver-
saries requires that, in the real implementation of the protocol
(without a TTP), each party does not learn more information
than in the ideal implementation. Finally, we assume that
parties do not collude with each other to recover other partic-
ipants inputs.
Private Set Intersection (PSI): a cryptographic protocol be-
tween two parties, server and client, on input, respectively,
S = {s1, . . . , sw} and C = {c1, . . . , cv}. At the end, the
client learns S ∩ C. There are several PSI instantiations,
with different complexities and cryptographic assumptions,
ranging from those based on Oblivious Polynomial Evalua-
tion (OPE) [15], to linear-complexity protocols based Obliv-
ious PseudoRandom Functions (OPRFs) [12], as well as op-
timized garbled circuits [29] leveraging Oblivious Transfer
Extension [20]. Naturally, the PSI definition above implies
that only one party (client) learns the set intersection, how-
ever, in the semi-honest model, PSI can trivially be turned to
a “mutual PSI” [23] (i.e., both parties learn the intersection)
by executing PSI twice with inverted roles.
Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA): a crypto-
graphic protocol between two parties, server and client, on
input, respectively, S = {s1, . . . , sw} and C = {c1, . . . , cv}.
At the end, the client learns |S ∩ C|. That is, PSI-CA is a
more stringent version of PSI as the client only learns how
many items are in intersection. While it is possible to mod-
ify garbled circuits based PSI constructions to support PSI-
CA [29], to the best of our knowledge, there is no available
description of the corresponding circuit or ready-to-use im-
plementation, therefore, we use the special purpose PSI-CA
protocol from [11]. This protocol is secure in the Random
Oracle Model under the One-More Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. It incurs
communication and computational complexities linear in the
size of the sets: parties need to exchange O(v + w) group
items, and compute O(v + w) modular exponentiations with
short exponents. Similar to PSI, in the semi-honest model,
two executions of PSI-CA with inverted roles yield a mutual
PSI-CA where both parties learn the cardinality of the set in-
tersection.
PSI with Data Transfer (PSI-DT): a cryptographic proto-
col between server and client on input, respectively, S′ =
{(s1, data1) . . . , (sw, dataw)} and C = {c1, . . . , cv}. At
the end, the client obtains {(si, datai | ∃ cj s.t. si = cj}.
In other words, the client not only learns which items are in
the intersection, but also gets related data records. Special
purpose protocols for PSI-DT have been proposed [15, 12],
but we do not know of any available garbled circuits based
instantiation. Hence, we use the PSI-DT protocol described
in [12], secure in the Random Oracle Model under the One-
More RSA assumption in the presence of semi-honest adver-
saries. It incurs communication and computational complex-
ities linear in the size of the sets: parties need to exchange
O(v + w) group items, and compute O(w) RSA-CRT expo-
nentiations and O(v) modular multiplications if one picks a
small RSA public exponent (e.g., 3 or 17). Once again, in the
semi-honest model, two executions of PSI-DT with inverted
roles trivially yield a mutual PSI-DT where both parties learn
the intersection.
Server-aided PSI [21]. In [21], Kamara et al. propose
a server-aided PSI relying on a semi-honest server: dur-
ing a setup phase, parties {P1, . . . , Pn} jointly generate a
secret key κ for a pseudorandom permutation (PRP). Each
party Pi then randomly permutes their set Si, by computing
PRPκ(Si), and sends the result to the server. This then com-
putes the intersection of the labels PRPκ(Si), i = 1, . . . , n
and returns it to all the parties. Finally, each Pi outputs the
inverse of PRP() over the intersection of the labels. The pro-
tocol is secure in the presence of a semi-honest server and
honest parties, or a honest server and any collusion of mali-
cious parties, if the PRP is secure.
Efficient Private Recommendation via Succinct
Sketches [27]. A privacy-friendly recommender sys-
tem based on Item-KNN [31] has been introduced by Melis
et al. [27]. Their construction involves a “tally” server
(the BBC in their application example) and a set of users
(visitors of BBC’s broadcasting site iPlayer). The main goal
of their system is to train the recommender system using
only aggregate statistics. Specifically, they build a global
matrix of co-views (i.e., pairs of programs watched by the
same user) in a privacy-preserving way, by relying on (i)
private data aggregation based on secret sharing (inspired
by [24]), and (ii) Count-Min sketches [8] to reduce the com-
putation/communication overhead from linear to logarithmic
in the size of the matrix, trading off an upper-bounded error
with increased efficiency.
If M denotes the number of items, the compact represen-
tation of the IP2IP through the Count-Min Sketch has size
O(log(M ∗M/2)). More precisely, given parameters (, δ),
the Count-Min Sketch is a matrix of size L = d × w where
d = dln (M ∗M)/(2 ∗ δ)e and w = de/e. Melis et al. [27]
set  = δ = 0.01, yielding, e.g., L = 4, 896 for M = 1, 000,
and L = 10, 336 for M = 224.
The parameters (, δ) give an upper bounded error for the
estimated counters cˆi amounting to cˆi ≤ ci + 
∑
j |cj | with
probability 1 − δ, where ci is the true element. As demon-
strated empirically by Melis et al. [27], the error ultimately
introduces a negligible impact on the accuracy of the aggre-
gation as well as the recommendation. Finally, the com-
putational overhead introduced by the cryptographic opera-
tions for private aggregation, as demonstrated experimentally
in [27], are in the order of seconds even with thousands of
items.
B Clustering Algorithms
Agglomerative Clustering. Hierarchical Clustering algo-
rithms build nested clusters by merging or splitting them suc-
cessively. The hierarchy is represented as a tree, with the
root being the unique cluster that gathers all the samples, and
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the leaves the clusters with only one sample. Agglomerative
clustering performs hierarchical clustering using a bottom-
up approach: each observation starts in its own cluster, and
clusters are successively merged together. Different linkage
criteria determine the actual metric used to merge, e.g., aver-
age linkage minimizes the average of the distances between
all observations of pairs of clusters, while complete linkage
minimizes the maximum distance between the observations
of pairs of clusters.
k-means. k-means clustering separates samples in groups of
equal variance, minimizing inertia or within-cluster sum of
squares. The k-means algorithm requires the number of clus-
ters to be specified as it divides a set of N samples X into
k disjoint clusters C, each described by the mean µj of the
samples in the cluster. The means are commonly called the
cluster “centroids” and the algorithm chooses centroids that
minimize
∑n
i=0minµj∈C(||xj − µi||2). The algorithm in-
cludes three steps: (1) choosing the initial centroids, often by
choosing k samples from X; (2) assigning each sample to its
nearest centroid; and (3) creating new centroids by taking the
mean value of all samples assigned to each previous centroid.
The algorithm loops between (2) and (3) until the difference
between the old and the new centroids is below a threshold.
k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN). k-NN is a simple machine
learning algorithm that finds a predefined number of train-
ing samples closest in distance to a new sample. The number
of samples can be a user-defined constant and the distance
can be any metric measure: standard Euclidean distance is
the most common choice. In Section 5, we employ unsuper-
vised k-NN to identify, for each organization, its most similar
ones.
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